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DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUDITING
STANDARDS: THE STRANGE CASE
OF RAYMOND MARIEN AND THE
FRAUD AT INTERSTATE HOSIERY
MILLS, 1934-1937
Abstract: In February 1938, the police arrested Raymond Marien, a
small, bookish man, for forging checks at Interstate Hosiery Mills,
Inc. During the ensuing investigation, the New York Attorney General’s office found that Marien had “juggled” the books of the corporation and that these accounting irregularities inflated Interstate
Hosiery Mills’ assets by $1.9 million or about 40% of the company’s
assets. In an irony of history, the company’s external auditors, as it
turned out, employed Marien. The extensive investigation conducted
by the SEC into Marien’s manipulations found that, save for forged
checks amounting to about $2,000, Marien and others were exonerated from any financial gain in the fraud due to the increased value
in Interstate’s shares. In the end, the fraud and the SEC rulings would
serve as a foundation of many modern accounting and auditing principles related to auditor independence, supervision, and management
responsibility.

INTRODUCTION
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s
(AICPA) [2009] trial-board proceedings from March 2009 reported that the Institute disciplined a CPA from New York under
rule 101 of the Code of Conduct. According to the complaint,
“The auditor created journal entries, coded deposits, and disbursements for reporting in the general ledger without obtaining
client approval. As a result, the auditor audited his own work.”
This was a classic case of a lack of independence on the part
of an auditor. The AICPA suspended the member and required
him to complete 50 hours of continuing professional education
and submit to a peer review. The AICPA’s decision highlights the
Published by eGrove, 2010
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importance placed on the concept of independent audits, with
the genesis of rules that can be traced to a 1938 Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) ruling that dealt with Interstate
Hosiery Mills, Inc. (IHM) and Raymond Marien, an employee of
the firm’s independent auditors.
The following paper details the story of Raymond Marien’s
fraud at IHM. As the evidence will show, the exact amount of
the fraud or the methods followed to accomplish it were never
pinpointed definitively. Thus, the paper will present the balances
from various sources to give as complete a picture as possible
of the financial events that led up to the SEC’s report and ruling
even though the numbers may not directly reconcile. The materials used as evidence in the paper come from SEC case reports;
contemporary newspapers, magazine, and journal articles; as
well as later Accounting Series Releases (ASRs) that quoted and
used the ruling. In addition, the paper includes a brief history of
the company; a discussion of the dual investigations by the New
York attorney general and the SEC into the alleged accounting irregularities; and the life of Raymond Marien, the primary
character. Finally, the resultant 1939 SEC ruling is explored as
it relates to the development and application of modern auditing
standards related to supervision, independence, and management responsibility.1
THE ORGANIZATION OF IHM
According to the New York Times (NYT) [1929a, p. 47],
IHM was organized as a Delaware corporation. Its purpose was
to acquire the stock of several competing hosiery companies
and consolidate mill operations. These companies included
the Brilliant Silk Hosiery Company of Bloomfield, New Jersey;
the Finery Silk Hosiery Company in Clifton, New Jersey; and
the Lansdale Silk Hosiery Company in Lansdale, Pennsylvania
just north of Philadelphia. The new company named Selig, the
former sales manager of the Gotham Silk Hosiery Company, as
the chief operating officer of the new concern, with several managers from the consolidated companies named in supporting
positions. The NYT [1929c, p. 42] published a stock prospectus
for the new company that noted the financials were examined
1
Two 1939 editorials evidenced the importance of the SEC ruling. The first,
written by Carey [1939] in the Journal of Accountancy, will be discussed later in
the paper. The second in The Texas Accountant [1939, p. 8] commented that the
“case is of sufficient importance to justify thorough study of the Commission’s
release.”
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by “Messers Haskins and Sells.” The article also mentioned that
the consolidation of the three mills would “...result in the formation of a company equipped to serve the trade with an unusually
wide variety of merchandise distributed through varied channels producing a complete line covering a wide range in price of
woman’s plain and fancy full fashioned silk hosiery.”
IHM completed the consolidation through the exchange
of 110,000 shares of its stock for the shares of the three pred
ecessor companies. Another article in the NYT [1929b, p. 40]
reported pro-forma 1928 income for the combined company at
an estimated $386,000 or about $3.51 per share on $4.1 million
in sales. The company also reported that there was no funded
(long-term bonds) debt or preferred stock, but it did have
$159,000 in mortgages outstanding on properties with an appraised value in excess of $1.78 million.
A few days after the merger, the second NYT [1929b] article
reported that the investment banking firms of Ernst and Co. and
Strupp and Co. took the newly consolidated company “public”
and asked for trading privileges on the New York Curb Market.
This request came with the issuance of 78,500 shares of newly
issued, no-par IHM common stock with a prospectus price of
$30.00 per share. The prospectus indicated that the purpose of
the $2.5 million offering was for “the immediate expansion…
inasmuch as two companies have been operating day and night
shifts and one company has been under the necessity of purchasing annually from outside sources several hundred thousand dollars of merchandise.…Substantial savings are expected
through the consolidation of dyeing, finishing, and shipping
departments.”
To sweeten the deal, the prospectus also announced that the
Board of Directors had declared an initial 45¢ per share dividend for June 29, 1929. While the newly formed company settled in their new location on the thirteenth floor of 232 Madison
Avenue, the Curb Market admitted IHM for trading on March 7,
1929. IHM was now in operation, but it would soon face Black
Tuesday (October 24, 1929) and the Great Depression.
For the next four years, the company would struggle
through the depression reporting decreases in prices of hosiery
several times as demand waned. There was an eventual reduction of the dividend rate in 1930 from 45¢ to 35¢ per share to
conserve cash [NYT, 1930a, p. 47]. In addition, the NYT [1930b,
p. 39] listed several of IHM’s judgments against customers that
had a problem paying their bills. To stabilize sales, the company, along with other hosiery manufacturers, created an inPublished by eGrove, 2010
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dustry financing company to help its customers stay in business
especially around the holidays in 1930 [NYT, 1930c, p. 49]. The
company would not show an economic turn-around until mid1932. In that year, the company posted profits of 82¢ per share
after showing moderate losses the previous two years [NYT,
1934a, p. 34]. Prices of finished hosiery began to rise in 1933 at
about the same time DuPont introduced rayon, a stronger synthetic thread, to America’s textile manufacturers [NYT, 1933, p.
20]. During 1934, the company complied with the new registration requirements for publicly held companies under the 1933
Securities Act, putting it under federal regulation that included
the proper disclosure of its financial condition [NYT, 1934b, p.
33]. The IHM came out of the depression with a strong income
report in February 1934 of $462,000 or $4.81 per share [NYT,
1934a, p. 34]. In the end, the company would survive the worst
economic downturn in U.S. history only to confront a more
daunting set of problems in early 1938.
DISCOVERY OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES
Troubles at the New York Curb Market: According to the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) [1938a], on February 15, 1938, the officials
of the IHM arrived at their offices on Madison Avenue in New
York like any other day. The company was in its tenth year. During the day, the New York Curb Market2 informed the company
that it was about to suspend the trading of IHM’s stock after
the company itself reported that several accounting irregularities had been found in its yet to be released 1937 annual report.
These irregularities included the wanton falsification of the company’s annual reports for the published years 1934 through 1936
and the unreleased year of 1937. The irony of the situation was
that none of the company’s officials were accused of this fraud.
Rather, the accused was Marien, an employee of the company’s
auditors, Homes & Davis (H&D). The story became a minor
sensation in the newspapers of New York City until the more
salacious and deadly revelations about McKesson-Robbins 3
pushed it to the back pages a few months later. Felker [2003, p.
45] pointed out that the actions of the people in the IHM case
“reflect the origins [of the SEC’s] longstanding views on the role
2
The New York Curb Exchange was the former name of the American Stock
Exchange.
3
McKesson & Robbins was a New York drug manufacturer whose management defrauded stockholders through the “manufacture” of false accounting documents that were not properly reviewed by its outside auditor, Price Waterhouse.
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of and responsibilities of executives and auditors.” Felker further commented that the IHM case thrust the principles of auditor independence, supervision, and management responsibility
to the forefront of the profession and fundamentally changed
the philosophy of auditing in much the same way that the more
famous 1938 McKesson & Robbins case changed the way audits
were conducted.
Homes & Davis CPAs: The NYT [1939b, p. 37] reported that
Henry Homes and Morton Davis founded the CPA firm H&D
in 1917. The firm’s offices were on Fifth Avenue, not far from
IHM’s corporate offices. IHM originally retained H&D as its
auditors in 1928 to prepare pro-forma financials used in the
upcoming March 1929 prospectus. H&D was probably selected
because of the firm’s previous connection to one of its subsidiaries, Finery Silk Hosiery. In addition, the firm had a reputation
as experts in the field of textile and apparel industry accounting
[NYT, 1923, p. E10]. At the time of its association with IHM,
there were about 90 employees, including Marien, working for
the CPA firm.
Raymond Marien: McCarten [1962, p. 443] mentioned that
Marien began employment at H&D circa 1928. He was described as a “slight, clerkish man in his late thirties [with]
intelligent eyes magnified by rimless glasses.” The NYT [1938b,
p. 8] reported that he neither drank nor smoked, giving the impression “of conservatism and utter reliability.” The SEC Report
[1939, p. 711], regarding this incident, mentioned that Marien
had interviewed for the job at H&D in May 1928. This was in
response to an advertisement in the NYT. Marien informed the
firm that he was a graduate of the University of Montreal4 and
had eight years of “public accounting experience, including
industrial, mercantile, banking and brokerage assignments.” He
then reportedly told the CPA firm that he had been working for
F.A. Bergeman, a local New York bookkeeping firm, from 1920
to 1928. H&D sent a request to Bergeman and received a letter
of reference from that company indicating that Marien was “a
thoroughly competent senior accountant.” It highly recommended him for his “keen analytical ability, sound mental training,
his tact, his loyalty and the thoroughness of his work.” H&D ap4
According to McCarten [1962, p. 444], Marien entered the University of
Montreal at age 14 and worked for the Canadian Ordinance Bureau during World
War I.

Published by eGrove, 2010

5

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 5
72

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2010

peared to have completed its “due diligence” and hired Marien
“without further investigation.”
As it turned out, the letter from Bergeman must have been a
forgery. McCarten [1962, p. 449] reported that Marien had actually been working as an auditor for Price Waterhouse and Company on the D’Orsay (a New York perfume importer) account
during the time he reportedly was working for Bergeman. This
is the first of many contradictory stories in the press about this
case. Earlier in the decade, the NYT [1925, p. 23], reported that
the Paris police had arrested one Erasmus Raymond Marien
after he had jumped bail on a charge of stealing $16,000 from
D’Orsay, Inc. The article implied that Marien had worked for the
New York office of D’Orsay and had looted the local checking
account before leaving for Paris. In fact, Marien was an auditor for D’Orsay’s CPA firm, Price Waterhouse. After his arrest
in Paris and extradition to the U.S., Marien apparently plead
guilty to the theft charges. The NYT [1938b, p. 8] reported that
the court convicted Marien on the outstanding indictments and
that he was sentenced to an “indeterminate period in jail not to
exceed three years.” McCarten surmised that Marien’s relatively
light sentence in this instance was the result of his explanation
to the judge that he had used the money to feed his family and
not on “dissipations.” It is very difficult to say without the ac5
tual records, but Marien may have stayed in the “Tombs” for
about a year and a half, and probably was released from jail several months before he interviewed for the job at H&D. McCarten
suggests that the New York City parole officials immediately lost
track of Marien as he promptly reinvented himself by working at
odd jobs and by making a minor change from his given name of
Erasmus Raymond to simply Raymond.
From the available reports, it is difficult to say when H&D
sent Marien to IHM’s Lansdale, Pennsylvania mill, but in March
1930, the CPA firm named Marien the senior auditor at that
location after a staff resignation.6 One very confusing question
arises with this near-permanent job appointment. Why did H&D
send an employee from the New York office to Lansdale, about
120 miles from his home, when the position could have been
staffed out of the firm’s Philadelphia office which had opened
about four years prior to Marien’s employment [NYT, 1924, p.
40]? Marien’s own penchant for lying could have been the basis
The “Tombs” is the colloquial name for Manhattan’s central holding jail.
The SEC Report [1939, p. 712] hinted that Marien was the accountant in
charge of the first audit of IHM in June 1929.
5
6
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for this decision. During the SEC hearings, Marien’s supervisor, Theodore Phillips (the person who had hired him), testified
that his employee seemed to have had a better knowledge of the
silk and hosiery business than he did. As it turned out, Phillips
would endure most of the criticism faced by the CPA firm for
his lack of supervision over Marien. Even as Marien’s misdeeds
became known, Phillips later testified that “he was the best accountant he ever had…industrious conscientious and glutton for
work” [WSJ, 1938e, p. 36], but he also admitted the Marien acted
both as the senior accountant on the job and the supervisor “so
his falsifications escaped unnoticed” [NYT, 1938h, p. 23].
After Marien’s first year in-charge of the Lansdale audit,
IHM’s officials asked H&D if he could supervise the bookkeeping
staff there since the company had no controller at that location.
This fact, coupled with an unbridled confidence in Marien’s ability and veracity, was the beginning of a long string of problems.
McCarten [1962, p. 445] comments that the company eventually entrusted him with “complete control over all its accounting matters” at the plant. By 1934, except for the mill’s cost
accountant, Marien was the sole contact between the plant and
the corporate offices in New York, going so far as to “certify” the
materials that he personally had reviewed as the supervisor of
the bookkeeping staff. Nobody at this point seemed to question
this apparent conflict of interest or foresee any future difficulties with auditor independence. While Marien diligently went
about his duties between 1934 and 1938, IHM’s stock price grew
nearly six-fold from $7.00 to $42.00 per share [NYT, 1938b, p. 8].
McCarten [1962, p. 445] wryly noted, “...in back of this bustling
prosperity stood the inspired accounting of Marien.”7
The end for Marien, aged 45, came rapidly in February
1938 when Harold Greenwald, IHM’s corporate secretary,
received a note from its bank in Lansdale informing him that
his request to forward certain cancelled checks to Mr. Marien
could not be honored because a clerk had already dispatched
that month’s bank statements to the company. This mistake by
the bank’s clerk turned out to be quite serendipitous. Greenwald
quickly realized that he had a problem because he knew that
he had never sent such a request to the bank. Upon investigation, he found the two checks, totaling $800, had been forged
by Raymond Marien, their trusted accountant. After confessing
7
The NYT [1938c, p. 29] reported that New York investment journalist Leo
Bercow was “fired by enthusiasm” to recommend IHM’s stock based on the company’s falsified cash position.
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his forgery, H&D officials fired Marien, but in a strange turn of
events, IHM’s officials asked that he remain in his position to
complete the annual report from the Lansdale mill that the company needed for its annual meeting in two weeks. SEC Report
[1939, p. 710] noted that Greenwald “thought it improbable that
there were any irregularities other than the forgeries.” He could
never have envisioned the troubles that were about to beset
IHM; troubles that would eventually change the fundamental
philosophy behind external audits.
THE NEW YORK STATE INVESTIGATION
The NYT [1938b, p. 8] reported that IHM caught Marien
forging four other checks for an additional $1,200 during the
time he stayed on at the mill. This forced H&D to remove him
from the position on February 8, 1938. The CPA firm dispatched
an unnamed replacement from the New York office to the
Lansdale mill. In the course of familiarizing himself with the
accounts, the new accountant asked to compare the books at the
mill with those of the corporate offices in New York. Within a
short period, it was clear that $2,000 in check forgeries was not
the real problem caused by Marien. By February 10, the new accountant reported to Davis, a founding partner of the CPA firm,
that it appeared that there were large discrepancies between the
books of IHM’s New York office and the books of the mill. McCarten [1962, p. 446] noted that, “the Homes & Davis operative
discovered that the New York books, on which Interstate was
paying off,8 bore only the sketchiest relation to reality.” He went
on to write, “for almost four years Interstate had been basing
salaries, dividends, bonuses, and general financial policy on
balance-sheets which Raymond Marien had just made up out of
his own head.” This revelation brought the full weight of the law
down on both Marien and the company.
On February 16, 1938, the police arrested Marien at his
home, an apartment in Sunnyside, Long Island, where he lived
with his wife and three adolescent children.9 He was booked into
the familiar confines of “The Tombs,” where he was questioned
8
In using the verbiage “paying off,” it should be noted that McCarten was a
journalist and not an accountant. One would presume that he meant IHM’s payment of dividends or bonuses and not illegal gambling debts.
9
McCarten [1962, p. 444], reported that Marien married a Toronto socialite
whose wealthy father disagreed with the marriage. She stood by Marien through
these troubles and, after he went to prison, worked as a waitress to support her
family.
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by the New York State Attorney General’s Office.10 McCarten
[1962, p. 446] wrote that Marien soon confessed to his “juggling”
the books, stating that he was “overworked and under nervous
strain.” The NYT [1938d, p. 2] reported that Assistant New York
Attorney General Ambrose V. McCall told his supervisors that
Marien “had confessed that he had exaggerated the corporation’s assets in the public balance sheets for several years.” The
newspaper went on to write that the accountant said that he
“had falsified the accounts on a ‘crazy impulse’ at no profit to
himself.”11
Even with a confession in hand, the Attorney General’s Office continued its investigation, seeking to learn if the officers of
the mills had profited from the falsified statements. Accordingly,
McCarten [1962] related that investigators from the Attorney
General’s Office questioned Marien almost daily trying to understand what he had done. Marien, for his part, taunted them by
“expounding on financial theory and practice,” while admitting
to investigators what items he had “fudged,” and explaining that
none of the problem could be corrected without his help. As it
turned out, his financial manipulations were actually “secondrate” in nature. The SEC report would conclude that had someone at the company actually read the reports from Marien, the
problems at the company would have been discovered, a theme
parroted by many sources.
During all of the interrogations, Marien never varied his
story, and he never implicated any other official at IHM. To rule
out an insanity plea, an investigator sent Marien to Bellevue
Psychiatric Hospital for an evaluation where he was found to
have “superior intelligence” [NYT, 1938i, p. 13]. Marien even
went so far as to write letters to the attorney general explaining
how ignorant his investigators were. While in jail, Marien also
became what modern parlance would call a “jail-house lawyer”
by preparing writs of habeas corpus on behalf of other prisoners.
In May 1938, McCall, acting for the then New York Attorney
General Bennet, conducted further hearings into the matter.
The NYT [1938e, p. 33] reported that the first witness for these
hearings was Henry I. Hann from S.D. Leidesdorf and Co., the
firm that conducted the re-audit of the IHM. Hann testified that
10
In the intervening six days between discovery and Marien’s arrest, the company and its auditors informed both the Curb Market and the SEC of the problems leading to the market’s trading suspension on February 15, 1938.
11
According to the NYT [1938g, p. 35], Marien was in the Tombs “on default
of $15,000 bail.”
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Marien had just “added $100,000 here and $100,000 there” at
the Lansdale mill and reported the following inflated income:
1934
$374,966

1935
$195,772

1936
$409,127

1937
$951,122

Hann’s testimony further showed the extent of the problems
when he noted that IHM would have actually shown a loss of
$56,799 for 1937 without Marien’s manipulations. This forced
the officers of the corporation to return all but $90,000 of the
$269,000 paid in bonuses since 1934. Hann testified that the
discrepancies could easily have been found by Marien’s supervisors at H&D or the officials at IHM had they done something as
simple as comparing the central-office books with those of the
mill. Hann ended his testimony by demonstrating that the company was still solvent despite the accounting problems.
At this revelation, it appears that the principals from the
companies involved tried to distance themselves from the
scandal. For example, a WSJ [1938c, p.17] article of February
18, 1938 reported Homes, the managing partner of H&D, testified that “monthly statements made up by [Marien] were sent
to officers of Interstate but they had not been checked against
the company’s books or the inaccuracies would have been apparent.” Next, Greenwald, IHM’s treasurer, testified that the
company had no head bookkeeper (a modern controller) at the
New York headquarters. Because of this odd situation, there
was apparently no accountant on staff to compare the mill and
corporate books. Fundamentally, Marien had kept impeccable
books for the mill, but falsified the reports he sent to the New
York corporate office where his manipulations would have easily been discovered if proper internal-control procedures were
in place. Finally, the WSJ [1938b, p. 12] reported that Selig, the
president of the IHM, testified that he had “no knowledge that
the assets shown on the books were in excess of actualities.”
The WSJ [1938d, p. 13] from May 25, 1938 further enhanced
the information about the fraud by reporting that IHM’s 1937
earned-surplus account was $1,721,000, but should have been
$223,000 without Marien’s manipulations. The actual profits of
the company between 1934 and 1937 should have been approximately $440,000 compared with the reported $1,118,000. The inflated profits led to overpayment of income taxes and an excess
dividend payout of nearly $400,000 in addition to the improper
bonuses paid to IHM’s officials. By 1937, the manipulations had
inflated the company’s assets by nearly $1.9 million, including
inflated inventory of $904,000, accounts receivable of $701,000,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5
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and cash of $234,000. This pattern of inflated assets began in
1934 and grew as follows:
1934
$391,000

1935
$496,600

1936
1937
$756,000 $1,900,0000

Earlier articles discussing IHM’s case failed to explain how
Marien accomplished this financial manipulation other than
to comment that he “wrote-up” the accounts, even though the
primary manipulation turned out to be an understatement of
“prime cost of sales.” The understatement eventually caused the
higher than normal net-income figures. Using the information
published by the WSJ [1938a, p. 11], Exhibit A below shows a
composite balance sheet for IHM as of 1937 year-end. From the
figures given, the assets shown on the manipulated balance sheet
must have been in excess of $5 million, meaning that nearly 40%
of the firm’s assets were non-existent.
In the end, New York’s investigation left the complicated
process of explaining the manipulations and their consequences
EXHIBIT A
Interstate Hosiery Mills
Estimated Balance Sheet
December 31, 1937
Developed from materials published in the Wall Street Journal
[1938a, p. 11]
Assets
Cash
Net Receivables
Miscellaneous
Receivables
Inventories
Sundry
Patents and Goodwill
Net Plant and
Equipment Depreciation
and Mortgages
Deferred Charges
Total Assets

Liabilities and Equity
$151, 586

Accrued Taxes

$30,613

575,896

Notes Payable

714,500

Sundry Liabilities/
Accrued Taxes

50,648

Non—current Serial
Notes Payable

80,125

942
1,010,177
37,640
1
1,279,318

52,699

Capital Stock (par 20)

Surplus

1,963,820

266,553

Total Liabilities and
$3,108,259
Equity
Note: There is a $2,000 error in the reported liabilities and equity items compared to the reported total.
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to the coming investigation by the SEC. In addition, New York
officials could neither implicate any of IHM’s officers in the
fraud nor prove that Marien had financially benefited by his actions. All they had were the forged checks written on the First
National Bank of Lansdale. When Marien was arraigned before
Judge John Freshchi on forgery charges, he pled “not guilty,”
even though he had confessed his misdeeds to both officials of
IHM and his H&D employers [NYT, 1938f, p. 30].
THE SEC INVESTIGATION AND FINDINGS
As the news of the problems at IHM filtered through the
New York financial community, the New York Curb Market
informed the company on February 16, 1938, “that they had
suspended trading in the company’s stock pending an investigation.” The NYT [1938a, p. 42] reported that the company had
to postpone its annual meeting scheduled for that week and
would issue a new financial report after a new audit firm (S.D.
Leidesdorf and Co.) had an opportunity to complete its work. In
response to the problems at IHM reported by the NYT and the
WSJ over the previous four months, the regional SEC office in
New York announced hearings for June 28, 1938 to determine
if IHM’s stock should be permanently withdrawn from registration and trading on the Curb Exchange. Officials from the SEC
became involved due to the concern that the rapid growth in
IHM’s stock value resulted from the company’s misrepresentation of its financial condition. In addition, the SEC [1939,
p. 711] wished to investigate if the statements in annual registration forms fairly represented the condition of the company since
the SEC “had reason to believe the financial statements for the
years 1934, 1935, and 1936, filed with [the] Commission…were
false and misleading.” Finally the SEC’s investigation sought
to determine if H&D “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known,” that there were problems with
IHM’s financial condition.
In November 1938, a preliminary report filed by the SEC
found that both IHM and H&D were at fault for the accounting
irregularities. Both the company and its CPA firm challenged
the preliminary report. On December 6, 1938, all the parties
involved made “oral arguments” before the SEC. This later
investigation would report a cumulative $1.6 million of total
accounting irregularities for 1934-1936. The corresponding $1.9
million in overstated assets reported by the WSJ [1938d, p. 13] is
a cumulative balance-sheet figure that included amounts from
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5
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the unpublished 1937 IHM annual report. The SEC was not
interested in these numbers because the company had never
released the inflated 1937 annual report that the company corrected before it became part of the fraud. McCarten, however,
detailed the differences (Exhibit B) between Lansdale mill’s correct books and the numbers sent to New York in 1937.
EXHIBIT B
McCarten’s [1962] Published Balances
Account Title

New York
Accounts

Lansdale
Accounts

Difference provided
by authors in italics

Cash

$386,073

$151,839

$234,234

Accounts Receivable

1,263,543

561,605

701,938

Inventory

1,840,393

936,034

904,359

Total account changes

3,490,009

1,649,478

1,840,531

Profits
Total Assets

582,541

-56,759

525,782

$4,859,508

$3,382,558

$1,476,950

The overstated cash, accounts receivable, and inventory
amounts in the unpublished 1937 statements mirrored those
included in the SEC Report [1939, p. 718]. However, the inflated
profits reported by the NYT [1938e, p. 33] do not agree with
those reported by McCarten, and the inflated asset totals reported by the WSJ [1938d, p. 12] do not agree with those reported by
the SEC [1939]. Any attempt to reconcile the balances published
by the different publications is impossible without the original
documents. To make the process of the fraud even more confusing, the overstated amounts, especially for cash and receivables,
were accomplished without manipulating sales.
Brink [1939, p. 21] wrote that the cash management for
IHM was handled outside of the reports created by Marien since
“the Vice-President received a current report on bank balances
in the form of entries made in a book kept by his secretary.” This
report, and not Marien’s reports, was used to monitor IHM’s
cash position. A comparison of the two would have shown the
overstatement problem; however, it was a moot point due to its
lack of financial impact. Brink [1939, p. 21] also pointed out that
a review of the receivables and sales balances included in the
audit report would have indicated “a relationship that could not
have been possible under the credit terms and collection record
of [the company].” Again, the New York and Lansdale records
were never reconciled.
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The SEC Report [1939, p. 712] said that Marien’s manipulations did not take place in the actual account books of the Lansdale mill. Rather, he manipulated trial balances (the previously
mentioned balance sheets) that were sent to New York to be
consolidated with the reports from the other mills. As it turned
out, either H&D, IHM, or both should have found these manipulations quite easily if someone had bothered to compare them
with source documents. The SEC, though, did not seem too concerned with these overall problems because it concentrated on
manipulation of inventories and the understated cost of goods
sold, which actually were the culprits in inflating IHM’s profits.
In the final analysis, the SEC probably felt that the inflated
income, and its corresponding earnings per share number, did
more to help boost the stock price of the firm than the inflated
assets.
According to McCarten, Marien deflated the cost of goods
sold by manipulating what the SEC called the “prime cost of
sales.” In this case, he had to falsify raw-silk contracts and prices
from the commission knitters and throwsters (producers and exporters of raw silk) with whom IHM dealt. The SEC noted that
during the audit season, Marien supervised approximately 20
audit staff from the CPA firm. Each staff member was responsible for different parts of the ledger, with one conducting an
audit of cash and another the confirmation of receivables while
part of the staff dealt with inventories. Marien, however, conducted the valuation of the raw-materials inventory. This valuation supposedly included reviewed market reports for raw silk
which he ultimately changed to have the effect of understating
the cost of goods sold or, as IHM titled it, “prime cost of sales.”
The SEC Report [1939, p. 714] then mentioned that Phillips, the
partner on the engagement, testified that he specifically accepted
Marien’s valuation of raw materials because he was not familiar
with the silk market.
The overstatement of the principal balance-sheet accounts
was reported by the SEC [1939, p. 708] and is shown in Exhibit
C, along with author-developed analytics to help determine the
process of the fraud and its possible early discovery. Exhibit
C shows that the overstatement of assets in “principal balance
sheet accounts,” in each year under scrutiny closely follows
the gross profit overstatement. The SEC Report [1939, p. 708]
indicated that it appeared Marien was increasing the asset accounts like inventory and decreasing the cost of goods sold,
resulting in overstated assets and an overstated earned-surplus
account.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5
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1936

7.88

11.63

12.58%

7.45%

Sales-to-Receivables

COGS-to-Inventory

Gross-Profit Ratio

Correct GP Difference

(31,148)

915,484

Gross Profit (GP)

Total and GP
Overstatement
Difference

6,360,452

Cost of Goods Sold

195,731

342,633

373,781

7,275,936

Sales

22,044

124,858

GP overstatement

546,876

1,943,177

Inventories

Total

472,529

923,772

Cash

Accounts Receivable

45,956

(21,498)

150,628

129,130

5,422

77,752

68,000

471,763

201,153

202,610

145,682

1,124,334

8,321,667

9,446,001

2,485,847

1,473,392

866,773

(843)

7.50%

11.90%

5.65

10.90

(14,403)

415,631

401,228

349,059

53,012

67,157

872,991

550,212

255,622
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7.14%

9.14%

6.96

13.77

Trends Developed by the Authors

689,361

6,856,040

7,545,401

2,018,622

985,603

547,883

485,136

Current Year
Current Year
Current Year
Reported Overstatement Reported Overstatement Cumulative Reported Overstatement Cumulative

1934

Developed from SEC Report [1939, p.708]
Shaded numbers were developed by the authors.

Interstate Hosiery Mills
Analysis of Financial Irregularities by the SEC: 1934 to 1936

EXHIBIT C
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There were internal measurements besides the financial
statements that should have alerted management to problems at
Lansdale. First, as reported by the SEC, the sales-to-receivables
ratio increased during the three years (1934-1936). Second, inventory turnover should have immediately raised some concerns
because the increased inventories compared to cost of goods
sold should have alerted officials to possible over-production
problems. Finally, the gross-profit ratio should have been suspect as well. The corrected gross-profit ratio is the same for
1934 and 1935, and it can be assumed that the ratio would not
have been that much different in 1933. Anybody making this
simple calculation would have noticed that the ratio had almost
doubled from one year to the next, then dropping sharply from
1934 to 1935, and rebounding in 1936. Based on the SEC report,
IHM priced its products conservatively.
In the end, discovery of Marien‘s forged checks and subsequent disclosure of accounting irregularities apparently
occurred by accident and not through the proactive mechanisms
of internal control, supervision, and proper segregation of duties. Scheduled supervisory visits to the mill and reconciling account balances at corporate headquarters with account balances
at the mill would have gone a long way to mitigate the troubles
caused by Marien. But again, apparently nobody checked. Such
a lack of planning and supervision would be at the heart of the
SEC’s criticisms of the CPA firm.
THE SEC FINDINGS AND RULING
Supervision: On March 18, 1939, the SEC published a report
titled In the Matter of Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc. The report
brought the supervision of Raymond Marien (who had never testified) under close scrutiny. Phillips testified that he had acted as
both Marien’s supervisor and work-paper reviewer on the IHM
audit until 1931. Thereafter, Marien conducted the work without any supervision and only cursory review by Phillips, who
“was more concerned with the completion of all of the items on
the audit program.” He testified that he did this by “thumbing
through confirmations” and reviewing schedules that would tie
to later corporate consolidations.
Phillips also said that he did not review the auditor’s “summary mill cost sheets.” A review of these documents over a
period would have shown a history of “prime cost ratios”12 that
12
The ratio is calculated by dividing the prime cost of sales (in this case, raw
silk) by the mill’s related sales.
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could be compared to the reported figures, similar to a modern
analytical review of gross-margin percentages. Then, a deviation from the historical data should have given Phillips pause to
think and react to a possible problem (see Exhibit C). According
to the SEC, its investigation revealed that profits were overstated
principally by understating “prime cost of sales” (modern cost of
goods sold) in the profit-and-loss statements. Essentially, it appears that Marien purposely overstated the ending raw-materials
inventories. This error corresponded to the understatement of
cost of goods sold. How and why he did this is still unclear, but
the process can be seen in the following example13:
Cost of
Goods
Less
sold
Beginning
Add
Available Ending (Prime
Gross
Inventory Purchases Inventory Inventory Costs) Sales
Profit
Correct
25,000
225,000
250,000
20,000 230,000 700,000 470,000
Overstated 25,000
225,000
250,000
30,000 220,000 700,000 480,000

Prime
Cost Gross
Ratio Profit %
.3285
67%
.3143
69%

Assuming all other costs of manufacturing (e.g., direct labor and various overhead accounts) were not manipulated, the
overstated ending inventory decreased cost of goods sold and
increased gross profit. This in turn created a downward trend in
the prime-cost-of-sales-to-sales ratio and increased (or overstated) gross profits. This was the prime reason for the suspension
of trading privileges at the New York Curb Market.14
Even though Phillips did not review the mill reports, the
trial examiners, Adrian Humphrey and Pierce Bradley, dismissed this analytic review process as a means of identifying the
inventory problems because Marien’s manipulations of the trial
balances hid any problem from prying eyes.15 Though Philips
tacitly seemed to be exonerated in this area, in light of the true
inventory balances at the mill as reported by production manager Charles Frankel [SEC, 1939, p. 718], the upward trend in
Marien’s reported inventory balances and decreasing inventory
13
The manipulation of inventories was obviously intentional; an unintentional inventory error is self-correcting in the next accounting period providing no
other errors occur.
14
The SEC seems to say that the original investigation by New York State
either ignored the prime-cost-ratio issue or overlooked its importance. The SEC
mentioned the ratio data should have been put into evidence even though, in a
contradictory comment, “there was nothing in the falsified profit figures themselves which would have aroused suspicion.”
15
The fraud could have been identified earlier if the ratios had been significantly different from historical trends, but Marien just seemed to make small
changes over time.
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turnover accompanied by an increase in accounts-receivable
turnover should have necessitated an investigation and reconciliation with actual inventories. This very likely would have
uncovered Marien’s deceit sooner rather than later. Marien may
have prolonged this deceit by creating some manipulations that
gave the opposite effect of actually widening the ratios, making
it appear that inventories were actually increasing on an historical basis. How he did this was not explained.
The SEC examiners did not, however, fully exonerate
Phillips from negligence because in his lack of extensive workpaper review, he failed to notice that the trial balance, which is
included as part of any set of work-papers, had obviously been
manipulated with sheets replaced and doctored. Here the fraud
should have been apparent to both Phillips and IHM officials
because Marien did not bother to renumber the papers. Simply
put, the trial-balance pages that were numbered 1 of 7, or 2 of 7,
etc. were actually eight pages with Marien’s handwriting on the
false page along with an incorrect footing. The expert witnesses
brought in by the SEC [1939, p. 715] to review H&D’s practices
actually seemed to support Phillips’ work saying it was:
…generally sufficient for a reviewer to question the accountant in charge of an audit as to anything unclear
or unusual, accepting without check or verifications answers which appear to be reasonable; he does not necessarily examine the trial balance or other working papers
in detail; he ascertained the existence of confirmations,
but need not attempt to relate the amounts confirmed
to the figures in the report he is reviewing.
The SEC examiners took exception with these practices,
which were apparently quite prevalent within the auditing profession, and remonstrated that they were insufficient and “required thorough revision.” The SEC Report [1939, p. 716] then
went on to say that this type of partner or supervisory review
should first ensure “the integration of the original work papers
with the financial statements and second a searching analysis of
the ultimate facts developed in the course of the actual audit.” In
a rather lengthy discussion of the lack of supervision by H&D,
the trial examiner succinctly pointed out that a work-paper review that was more than just perfunctory in nature would have
“exposed the irregularities in this case.”
Supervision of the staff would become a hallmark of the
work of CPAs with the introduction of Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards by the Committee on Accounting Procedure

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5

18

evelopment of modern auditing standards: the strange case of Raymond Marien and the fraud at Interstat
Heier & Leach-López, The Interstate Hosiery Fraud

85

in 1948. In particular, the standards of field work highlighted
that “work is to be adequately planned and any assistants are to
be properly supervised” [Holmes, 1951, p. 4]. Arens and Beasley
[2003, p. 32] write that, “supervision is essential in auditing
because a considerable portion of the field work is done by less
experienced staff members.” In the case of H&D, the formal
audit program used by the company made it clear that it had
planned its audit of IHM well, but that the lack of supervision,
due to either complacency or laziness, had caused many of the
problems for the firm. Marien’s propensity for lies and deception
probably exacerbated those problems.
In the end, the SEC [1939, p. 715] failed to find that the
review made by Phillips, customary at H&D, “was less extensive
than that ordinarily made by accounting firms.” William Werntz
[1939, p. 1], the chief accountant of the SEC, commented on
the IHM and McKesson & Robbins cases as “evidence of the
inadequacies in the procedures and practices in auditing.” He
continued in his speech before the Ohio Society of CPAs on September 7, 1939, commenting that the SEC Report “…indicated
it was satisfied that an adequate review would have exposed the
irregularities and if the views of the registrant’s expert witnesses
were to be accepted as to the usual practice followed by [CPAs],
in reviewing the work of those responsible for the opinion that
the practice requires thorough revision.” An internal peer review
similar to that used in modern audit firms may have found the
problem of the lack of supervision on the IHM audit well before
the problems came to light.16
Independence: Over and above the falsified documents, the
trial examiners went on to question whether H&D had actually
completed an “independent audit.” The SEC went on to criticize
the process of the “mill auditors” completion and “certification”
of the “monthly detailed audit.” It felt that these reports were
not audited in the “true sense of the word,” and that H&D were
false in designating the monthly reports as audited. The SEC
Report [1939, p. 717] stated that the “certified reports could not
accurately be described as an independent audit for the amazing extent Marien had taken upon himself in the function of
bookkeeping as well as auditing for Interstate.” As discussed
previously, the officials of both companies never saw any conflict

16
The SEC [1949, pp. 12-13] noted that problems of lack of supervision not
only have to be addressed for junior employees, but for audit partners as well.
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between Marien’s dual responsibilities as auditor and bookkeeping supervisor. Testimony stressed that the standard journal of
the mill (in actuality, the mill’s ledger) was in Marien’s possession, and that he made entries in it even though officials of the
CPA firm said this was against company policy. Davis, partner in
the firm, testified, “if the accountant is permitted to do original
work, the purpose of the audit is lost” [SEC, 1939, p. 717].
The SEC’s comments expanded a ruling from a 1937 ASR
that an accountant cannot be deemed independent if he is an officer or director of the registrant or holds a significant financial
interest [SEC, 1976, p. 1]. By 1950, Rule 13 of the AICPA’s rules
of professional conduct reiterated this concept [Holmes, 1951,
p. 35]. Almost 60 years later, Section 210 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act bolstered independence rules by banning CPAs from auditing books that they helped prepare or accounting systems that
they either designed or helped install.
In addition to the standard journal, Marien, at the request
of IHM officials, also kept a “private ledger” that included accounts that management wanted kept secret from its employees.
The SEC did not seem to think this was an inappropriate course
of action, probably because Lansdale was a unionized mill. The
problem was that Marien had control over these records with
their contents (probably additional income), bypassing the income statement and posted directly to surplus after the closing
of the mill’s regular books. Though H&D apparently did not
know that Marien was completing original write-up work, it was
obvious that IHM officials approved of this arrangement. Such
work by Marien, in the opinion of the SEC, made the books of
the Lansdale mill unaudited. The SEC [1939, p. 717] rebuked
the practice by reporting, “Marien’s unchecked control not only
renders the Homes & Davis’ [audit] certificates false as to scope
of the audit made, but also imposes upon Interstate considerable responsibility for Marien’s misdeeds.” The independence
issues highlighted in the IHM case were used by the SEC [1972]
in a monograph to explain the guidelines and examples of situations involving the independence of accountants.
Management Responsibility: The findings against H&D did not
let the officials of IHM off the proverbial hook because the SEC
took exception with its review and control practices as well.
For example, reports coming from Frankel, the Lansdale mill’s
cost accountant, showed a different cost-per-dozen hose manufactured than Marien’s reports. These discrepancies were never
investigated by the company. The SEC [1939, p. 719] concluded
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5
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that the understatement of cost by the H&D accountant resulted
in an “overstatement of the average gross profit per dozen on
sales amounting to about 44 percent in the annual report for
1936 and 150 percent for the first six months of 1937.” Brink
[1939, p. 21] commented that the realization (production)
schedules and related orders “furnished to the officers should
have proved a basis for detecting the overstatements.”
Greenwald, who actually made the purchases of silk for the
company, should have also seen a “red flag” had he compared
his record of silk prices with Marien’s reports. These reports
would also have been identified as false had there been a comparison of monthly cash and receivables reports generated in
New York with those coming from Landsdale. In the SEC’s
[1939, p. 719] opinion, “if management had made any effort at
all to check the information in the H&D reports against that furnished by their own employees, Marien’s inventions would have
been discovered as soon as they began.” In the end, the SEC
found that the officers of IHM hardly read Marien’s reports, let
alone made any comparisons with internally generated figures;
yet, they were responsible for the ultimate content.17 In a lengthy
explanation of its judgment, the SEC [1939, p. 721] concluded
that:
…the fundamental and primary responsibility for the
accuracy of the information filed with the Commission
and disseminated among investors rests upon management. Management does not discharge its obligations in
this respect by the employment of independent public
accountants, however reputable. 18 …In our opinion
the conduct of Interstate’s Management in respect of
information which was to be the basis of reports submitted to the New York Curb Market, stockholders and
the Commission indicated a complete abdication of responsibility.…We conclude that the officers of Interstate
were at fault in failing to discover the falsification of the
financial statements filed with the Commission.19
17
The ruling did not change auditors’ relationships to third-party liability developed in Ultramares Corp v. Touche. According to the NYT [1939a, p. 30], the
only reported lawsuit stemming from Marien’s fraud came from Aaron J.Funk,
whose suit was over the excess bonuses that the officers eventually paid back.
18
In June 1947, the SEC’s ASR #62 used this verbiage to explain that independent CPAs should be careful in certifying “summary earnings tables” and other
condensed financial-reporting devices.
19
Montgomery [1949 p. 7] used the same quote to highlight management’s
responsibility for financial reporting. The quote showed the importance of the
IHM case after its adjudication. However, by the next edition [Montgomery, 1957,
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The responsibility of the accounting reports would be a
point of contention for many years. In 1947, the SEC [ASR #62,
p. 3] comments that the corollary to the IHM rulings is that,
“the accountant’s certificates are required not as a substitute
for management’s accounting of its stewardship but as a check
of that accounting.” In the mid-1980s, the AICPA, in an effort
to limit its members’ liability, included verbiage to this effect in
its model audit report presented in SAS #58, Reports on Audited
Financial Statements. In a more definitive manner, Title III of
Sarbanes-Oxley reiterated the findings of this long-forgotten
panel and made certain that corporate officials were formally
responsible for the financial reports of the company under the
threat of jail and fines.
The SEC Ruling: The general purpose of the SEC hearings originally was to determine if the suspension of IHM from trading
on the Curb Exchange should be made permanent, resulting in
formal de-listing and rescission of its right to trade shares of
stock. In this part of the ruling, the SEC found that the officers
of the corporation were negligent in their duties but not the
CPA firm. The SEC, however, also found that in the year since
the company had revealed its problems to the Curb Market, the
company had made a number of changes to mitigate any future
problems. For example, IHM’s prompt notification of the Curb
Exchange and the SEC allowed for a re-audit of the company’s
books with amendments filed on a timely basis. This seemed
to convince the SEC that there was no intent of wrongdoing on
the part of the officers of the corporation. Second, there was the
prompt return of excess bonuses paid to the corporate officers.
This showed that they were concerned with the institutional integrity of the company. Next, the company employed a corporate
controller with responsibility over all three mills, allaying any
SEC fears that this type of manipulation would happen again.
Finally, the company made employment contracts more flexible
as to bonuses as well as the removal of officers for cause. In the
end, the SEC [1939, p. 721] ordered that the “registration of the
common stock of Interstate Hosiery Mills on the New York Curb
Exchange shall not be suspended or withdrawn.”
An editorial by John L. Carey [1939, pp. 257-258] in the
Journal of Accountancy highlighted the importance of the SEC’s
p. 60], the reference had been dropped and relegated to a paraphrase that read:
“…in a well publicized decision…management has the fundamental and primary
responsibility for the accuracy of the financial statements.”
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finding in this matter. Carey emphasized the SEC’s supervision
position, but warned that the ruling does not “relieve the independent auditor of full responsibility for the exercise of reasonable care and diligence in making his check upon management’s
accounting.” He goes on to write that the volume of material is
too great for one person to scrutinize, and that the acts of subordinates are their responsibility, leading to a duty of “reviewing
adequately the work of staff assistance as to satisfy themselves
of its sufficiency.” Carey finished by indicating that the IHM
case may be a “freak one,” but it is the partner’s duty “to satisfy
his own mind as to the representations of his assistants are
sound and reasonable, and that they are based on sufficiently
extensive inquiry and investigation.” These comments were published before the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) issued
standards of fieldwork, supervision, and evidential matter in the
late 1940s.
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
The issuance of the SEC Report recommending the reinstatement of IHM’s trading privileges on the Curb Exchange
effectively ended the Raymond Marien fiasco. The WSJ [1939,
p. 2] reported that the Exchange allowed the trading of IHM’s
stock at 1:00 p.m. on March 24, 1939. For their part, IHM’s officials were required to return the remaining $90,000 in bonuses
paid to them from 1934-1936 even though this represented earnings from corrected financial statements [NYT, 1939a, p. 30].
Despite all the evidence from the hearings, this article alluded to
the continuing suspicion in public circles and that IHM’s managers would be dogged by rumors that they had put Marien up
to the task of “juggling” the books. In fact, the issues surrounding IHM’s difficulties would surface again as the McKesson &
Robbins fraud unfolded in late 1938. At that time, the president
of the New York Society of CPAs wrote a letter to the McKesson
inquiry committee stating that “recent investigations into such
[accounting problems] like Interstate Hosiery Company, have
revealed certain fundamental weaknesses into the preparation
of financial statements of large corporations” [NYT, 1938j, p. 4].
Within a few years, the Marien affair faded from the public
eye, and the future of IHM began to brighten. For example, the
1939 financials showed profits of $2.27 per share compared with
$2.15 in 1938 [NYT, 1940, p. 31]. Assets, however, were just $1.9
million after the reduction forced by the revelation that nearly
five million dollars in inflated assets were reported in 1937.
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IHM, however, would soon face some unusual problems as the
relations between Japan and the U.S. deteriorated. In July 1941,
President Roosevelt declared a de facto embargo on purchases
from Japan which produced 85% of the world’s silk at the time.
The ban, however, was not on the importation of Japanese
products directly, but rather on the transfers of U.S. hard currency to that country. This forced all silk hosiery manufactures
to begin using more synthetic fibers like nylon.
Even with this problem, the company successfully survived
the transition to the war years, posting $4.723 per share earnings in 1941 that allowed a restructuring and a repurchase of
$500,000 of outstanding shares from the market [NYT, 1942,
p. 29]. By 1943, however, the fortunes had turned as the NYT
[1943, p. 26] reported the sale of the Bloomfield, New Jersey
plant in January of that year. This event, along with a reported
65% drop in earnings per share in 1942 due to a limited production of women’s fine hosiery because of wartime silk shortages,
began the slow decline of IHM.
In 1945, the company voluntarily ceased trading on the
Curb Exchange [NYT, 1945, p. 28], and by the early 1950s, nylon
shortages in the industry due to the Korean conflict left the
company financially weak. In November 1953, IHM accepted a
contract to sell all of its operating assets to Green Cove Hosiery
Corporation, a subsidiary of Burlington Mills. According to
Greenwald v. Commissioner, Green Cove agreed to purchase “all
of Interstate’s operating assets, real property, inventories, accounts receivable, leases, name, customer lists, goodwill.” In the
end, IHM’s name was changed to I.L.H. Corporation, and the
textile company was converted to an investment company.
What happened to Raymond Marien during this period?
The NYT [1939b, p. 37] reported on October 26, 1938 that Raymond Marien reversed his plea and admitted guilt to the charge
of “attempted forgery.” The court sentenced Marien to two and
one-half years in prison at the Ossining Correctional Institute
(Sing Sing) on November 4, 1938. The NYT further reported that
he received this rather harsh sentence because it was his second
offense for the same crime. This time he could not claim it was
to help his family. The article went on to mention that Marien’s
sentence for attempted forgery grew “out of his mysterious falsification of accounts and inventories of the hosiery concern.”
Other than a brief mention in the litigation entitled In
terstate Hosiery Mills v The First National Bank of Lansdale,
Marien’s trail stops with the 1939 McCarten article. In this case,
IHM sued the bank to recover the losses incurred by the comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/5
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pany from the forged checks passed by “Ray Marien” and paid
by the bank. The 1940 case suggested that Marien was still in
prison for passing the checks at a New York bank.20 McCarten
[1962, p. 447] wrote that to the end, Marien maintained his defense that he was overworked and that stress made him falsify
the records. However, the author mused that “overwork might
more reasonably be accepted as the result rather than the cause
of Marien’s hocus-pocus,” because “the work involved was just
about five times what it would have been had he been keeping
honest records.” Did the long “commute” to the job and days
away from an apparently normal and loving family life exasperate this situation? The answer is unknown; however, McCarten
[1962, p. 447] felt he could easily identify Marien’s motivation
for the check forgeries as “a string of bad luck at the horse
track.”
Though the name of Raymond Marien is probably unknown
to most accountants, and his motivations for the fraud may
never be known, its result would have far-reaching effects on
the conduct of audits that have lasted into the 21st century.
The auditing profession fundamentally changed its philosophy
for the planning and control of audits. The related principles of
auditor independence, supervision, and management responsibility for the accounting records can be traced to Marien’s
actions in much the same way as the more famous 1938 McKesson & Robbins case changed the procedural conduct of audits to
confirm inventories and accounts receivable. To reiterate Felker
[2003, p. 45], this research pointed out that the actions of the
people in the IHM case “reflect the origins [of the SEC’s] longstanding views on the role of and responsibilities of executives
and auditors.”
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